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     COINTEGRATION, ERROR CORRECTION, AND 
THE MEASUREMENT OF OLIGOPSONY CONDUCT IN 
THE U.S. CATTLE MARKET 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Cattle producers often claim that, because four beef-packers slaughter more than 80 
percent of the cattle in the United States, cattle prices are below what they should be had 
the industry been less concentrated.  However, preponderance of econometric evidence 
suggests that, although cattle prices are below their competitive level, the difference is 
often not big enough to warrant concern.     
Most of the evidence is forthcoming from research along the lines of what is called 
the New Empirical Industrial Organization, where market power is treated as a parameter 
to be estimated from single industry time-series data, rather than something to be 
measured from accounting data as used to be the case in past cross-industry studies.  
When using time-series data, however, presence of non-stationarity and co-integration of 
variables renders conventional significance unreliable, leading to erroneous inference 
about industry conduct.   Since none of the past studies of the beef-packing industry 
considered the properties of the time series before estimation of oligopsony conduct, it 
remains to be seen whether the finding of benign market power in the industry still hold 
when more appropriate econometric techniques are used. In this paper, oligopsony 
conduct is estimated by adapting to the oligopsony case the dynamic oligopoly model 
proposed by Steen and Salvanes (1999).  Their model is a reformulation of Bresnahan’s 
(1982) oligopoly model within an error correction framework.      4
     Using quarterly data for the 1970-2002 periods, the hypothesis of competitive 
conduct in the short-run and in the long-run cannot be rejected.  The short-run estimate of 
oligopsony conduct is 0.0012064 and the long-run estimate is 0.00523.  Both are not 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level of significance.  The results represent 
another piece of econometric evidence pointing to competitive conduct in the beef-
packing industry despite increased levels of concentration.  
One particular aspect is rising concentration in the beef-packing industry and its 
effect on live cattle prices.  Data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Grain 
Inspection Packers and Stockyards Administration (USDA-GIPSA) show that both the 
number and the size distribution of beefpacking plants changed dramatically in the recent 
years.  Between 1980 and 1999 the number of plants decreased from 704 to 204, and the 
share of the top four firm in steer and heifer slaughter increased from 35.7 percent to 80.6 
percent, and Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) of concentration rose from 561 to 1920. 
  According the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, an industry with HHI 
exceeding 1800 is considered highly concentrated.  Preponderance of evidence while the 
beef-packing industry exerts some degree of market power when procuring live cattle, 
that degree, according to some, is not large enough to warrant concern.  Others argue that, 
given the large volume of cattle slaughtered every year, even a small degree of market 
power can translate into large transfers from the cattle producers to beef-packers.  Yet 
others note that losses to cattle producers are more than offset by the cost savings 
generated by increased concentration in the beef-packing industry.  More importantly, as 
more slaughter cattle is now procured through contracts, otherwise know as captive 
supplies, there is also concern that packers may also “manipulate” cash prices to    5
influence the base price used to negotiate contracts.  Granted that there is merit to each of 
the preceding arguments, all of them hang to a large degree on the academic research that 
guides them.  The issue, however, is that the use of time series in estimation of market 
power poses special problems for inference when data are non-stationary and co-
integrated.  In that case, use of conventional significance tests may lead one to 
erroneously reject or fail to reject competitive conduct.  So far none of the studies of 
beef-packing conduct has taken advantage of advances in times series analysis to mitigate 
the mentioned problems.  So, it remains to be seen whether past conclusions of benign 
market power in the industry still hold when the inference problems due to non-
stationarity and co-integration are resolved. 
 
1.2 Objective of the Study 
In light of the preceding, the purpose of this research is to revisit the econometric 
problem of estimating the degree of beef-packer oligopsony conduct in spot markets.  
The contribution of this study is that it takes into account dynamics elements of the 
industry.  The most common motivation for a dynamic approach is the statistical 
importance of accounting for short-run dynamics in the data, and solving the inference 
problem when using non-stationary data.     
   The modeling framework adapts Steen and Salvanes (1999) dynamic oligopoly 
model to oligopsony.  Shifts in livestock supply are used to identify short- and long- run 
indices of oligopsony conduct in beef-packing using an error correction framework.  The 
model allows for short-run departures from long-run equilibrium in the data.  These 
short-run deviations might be caused by factors such as random shocks, contracts,    6
seasonal shifts etc., and by including lagged observations of the endogenous variables, 
we take into account dynamic factors, which cannot be included in static models. 
      Thus, the error correction model framework provides a solution both to statistical 
problems generated by short-run dynamics and stationarity in the data that make static 
models inadequate.  
 
            2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several studies have investigated the exercise of market power in the beef packing 
industry.  Azzam and Schroeter (1991), in their paper “Implications of Increased 
Regional Concentration and Oligopsonistic Coordination in the Beef Packing Industry” 
used a simple calibration/ stimulation model to gage potential dangers of increased 
concentration and oligopsonistic coordination.  In their study findings were not as 
alarming as findings of conventional econometric studies.  The authors concluded that 
even perfect collusion in regional cattle market would depress price by only about one 
percent and reduce slaughter volume by only about one and a half percent.  
Azzam and Schroeter (1995) extended the foregoing model to analyze a problem first 
asserted by Williamson (1968): the market power/cost efficiency tradeoff in horizontal 
consolidation. Plant closings and acquisitions in beef packing may occur because of the 
potential improvement in plant utilization or cost efficiencies due to multi-plant operation.  
However, consolidation of production in larger, more efficient plants, or reorganization 
bringing existing plants under more unified control increases the concentration and may 
lead to greater market power.  The economic issue was whether or not the cost reductions 
achieved through economies of plant size or multi-plant operation offset allocative    7
inefficiency resulting from increased market power.  Findings showed that a reduction in 
marginal processing cost of 2.4 percent more than offset social welfare losses from 
market power stemming from a 50 percent increase in concentration and average plant 
size. The cost reduction actually achieved from a 50 percent increase in average plant 
size is about 4 percent.            
      Using  a  method  that  allows  market conduct to vary over time, Azzam and Park 
(1993), in their paper “Testing for Switching Market Conduct” adapted Bresnahan’s 
(1982) model to oligopsony rather than oligopoly, and found out that, beginning in 1977, 
conduct in the beef industry underwent a transition from competitive to modestly 
oligopsonistic. Results were based on annual data from 1960 to 1987.  
   Koontz, Garcia and Hudson (1993) in their paper “Meat-Packer Conduct in Fed 
Cattle Pricing: An Investigation Of Oligopsony Power”, assessed the degree of 
oligopsony power exercised by beef packers through examination of day to day 
movements in regional beef margin, by using the trigger-price model of “non-cooperative 
collusion” developed by Green and Porter (1994).  They applied the technique to daily 
beef margin data from each of four supply regions – Iowa, Eastern Nebraska, Western 
Kansas, and Texas-New Mexico- for each of two times periods: May 1980 to September 
1982 and July 1984 to July 1986.  Findings suggest beefpacker oligopsony alternated 
between periods of cooperative and non-cooperative pricing conduct. Beef packers were 
not successful in sustaining effective cooperation.  
Stiegert, Azzam and Brorsen (1993), in their paper “Markdown Pricing and Cattle 
Supply in the Beef Packing Industry”, explored the possibility that beefpacker conduct 
may be consistent with cattle pricing being determined adherence an average cost based    8
rule. Their results showed that average cost pricing of cattle was the rule during periods 
of expected shortfalls in cattle supply. Shortfalls induced packers to increase the 
markdowns, apparently to insure a margin adequate to cover processing costs resulting 
from inadequate cattle supply.  Estimates were based on quarterly data from 1972 
through 1986. 
 None of the past studies, however, considered the problem of non-stationarity that 
makes statistical inference unreliable as well as the inclusion of dynamic factors that 
make static models inadequate for estimation of oligopsony conduct.    
Steen and Salvanes, in their paper (1999) “Testing for Market Power Using a Dynamic 
Oligopoly Model”, were the first to derive a dynamic reformulation of Bresnahan’s 
(1982) oligopoly model in an error correction framework, and apply to the estimation of 
short- and long-run oligopoly conduct.  Applied to the French salmon market, results 
suggest the salmon market to be competitive in the long-run, but indicate that Norway 
has some market power in the short-run.   
 
    3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR IDENTIFYING   OLIGOPSONY CONDUCT 
  3.1 Theoretical specification  
Assuming the production relationship between processed beef and live cattle is of 
fixed proportions, both cattle and the beef can be denoted by the same variable Q. The 
supply function of live cattle is given by:    
Q= ƒ(P, Z; α) + η,                                    (1)    9
where Q is quantity of live cattle, P is supply price; Z is a vector of exogenous variables 
affecting supply.  The vector α denotes the parameters to be estimated, and η is an error 
term.  
Assuming, for simplicity, the supply function, takes the linear form:  
Q = α1 + αp P + αz Z + η,                          (2) 
its inverse is given by: 
P = (Q - α1 - αz Z- η) / αp. 
 Given P, packer total expenditures (TE) on livestock are denoted by:   
TE = P * Q = (Q² - α1 Q - αz Z Q - η Q) / αp , 
and  marginal expenditures by: 
ME = P + (Q/ αp).                                  (3) 
 In addition to expenditures on livestock, packers incur processing costs (C):  
C= ℐ (Q, W; β),                          
where W is a vector of exogenous factor prices, and β is a vector of parameters.  
Assuming packers are price takers in the wholesale beef, equilibrium in the live cattle 
market is given by:    10
                                          ME = NMVP,                                    (4) 
where NMVP = Pw- CQ is the marginal value product of the cattle net of processing 
cost, Pw is the price of the processed beef, and CQ is marginal processing cost assumed, 
for simplicity, to take the linear form: 
CQ=β1 + βQ Q + βW W + vt ,                                                          (5) 
where vt is an error term. 
Substituting from equation (3) and (5) into (4) yields:  
                          P + (Q/ αp) = Pw – CQ ,                                             (6) 
or                           (Pw – P - CQ) /Pw = (Q/ αp), 
which is the Lerner index for a pure monopsonist.        
For empirical implementation, it is more convenient to rewrite (6) as: 
M = λ (Q/αp) + β1 + βQ Q + βW W,                  (7) 
where M is the farm-wholesale price spread, and λ is a summary statistic measuring 
oligopsony power. Under perfect competition, λ=0  and the margin equals marginal 
processing cost. When λ=1, collusive oligopsony.  When 0 < λ < 1 various oligopsony    11
regimes apply. The econometric problem is to estimate λ along with the rest of the 
parameters in (7). 
 The starting point is to rewrite (7) as: 
                          M = β1 + δ Q + βW W,                                                   
 where    δ= (λ/αp) +βQ.  However, since δ is a composite of λ and βQ, it is not 
possible to determine them separately from knowledge of δ.  
 Figure 1 can illustrate the problem. The initial equilibrium in the live cattle market, 
given by point ‘a’, is consistent with both perfect competition, where S1 intersects with 
VMPc, and oligopsony, where ME1 intersects VMPm.  Suppose an exogenous shock 
causes a parallel shift in the supply curve from S1 to S2.  Although the equilibrium 
moves from ‘a’ to ‘b’, competition and oligopsony are not distinct.       
 
            Figure 1.  Market Power not Identified    12
  The problem is solved by introducing elements both of rotation and of vertical shifts in 
the supply curve (Figure 2).  In figure 2, this is indicated by the shift and rotation from S1 
to S2.  Under perfect competition the equilibrium moves from ‘a’ to ‘b’ tracing out the 
derived demand curve VMPc. On the other hand, under oligopsony the equilibrium 
moves from ‘a’ to ‘c’. Thus, when one shifts as well as rotates the supply curve, the 
hypothesis of perfect competition and oligopsony are distinct.      
      
         Figure 2. Market Power Identified 
The revised oligopoly with rotation and shift of the supply function is presented next. 
3.2 The Static Version  
Let the supply curve for live cattle at time t be given by: 
        Qt = α1 + αp Pt + αz Zt + αpz PtZt + ηt,                 (8)    13
 where, again Z is a vector of exogenous variables, which interact with P.   
Since the marginal processing cost for the packers at time t is given by: 
Ct=β1 + βQ Qt + βW Wt + νt, 
profit maximization now yields the new margin relation: 
  M = λ Q*+ β1 + βQ Q + βW W + ν                                   (9) 
where   Q*= [Q/(αp+αpz Z) ] 
The parameter λ is identified by first estimating the supply equation (8), and using the 
estimator of αp and αpz to construct Q*.  However, estimation of (8) and (9) as they 
are, ignores the possibility of non-stationary time series as well as the existence of 
dynamic factors.  All these elements might make the static model unreliable and 
inadequate for estimating the degree of oligopsony power. 
 
3.3 The Dynamic Version 
The most common motivation for a dynamic approach is the statistical importance 
of accounting for short-run dynamics in the data, and solving the inference problem when 
using non-stationary data.  
The error correction model framework allows for short-run departures from long-
run equilibrium in the data, and by including lagged observations  of the endogenous    14
(dependent) variables we take into account the importance of dynamic factors, the effects 
of which mean that adjustment from one equilibrium to the another generally takes place 
over a (sometimes extended) period of time. The absence of these dynamic factors from 
static models might make them inadequate. 
The standard approach to dealing with non-stationary time series has been to 
difference them as many times as needed to make them stationary. Once all series have 
been transformed to stationary, regression models can be applied and standard asymptotic 
inferences can be obtained. The problem with this approach is that differencing 
eliminates the long-run information contained in the levels of the variables.  
Another point to note is that if co-integrated I (d) variables are being used in a 
Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model, setting up a model solely in terms of differences 
and lags of the differences (to capture dynamics) is a misspecification.  The correct 
specification is one that includes an error correction mechanism. 
The next section shows, how the error correction model (ECM) formulation 
relates to the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model for the oligopsony framework 
used in this study.  In particular, it will be shown that the parameters representing the 
stationary long-run solution of the ADL model are the same as the long-run parameters 
found directly in an ECM model. 
 
3.3.a The Live Cattle Supply Function   
When the supply function, as given by (8), is parameterized by an ADL form with 
one lag and without an intercept term, it becomes:       15
  Qt=αp0Pt+αp1Pt-1+αz0Zt+αz1Zt-1+αpz0PtZt+αpz1Pt-1Zt-1+             
+αQ1Qt-1+ηt                                                         (10) 
The short-run parameters are the coefficients on the contemporaneous variables, i.e. αp0, 
αz0 and αpz0.  Since the long-run stationary equilibrium implies:   Q = Qt = Qt-1,   P 
= Pt = Pt-1,  Z = Zt = Zt-1 and PZ = PtZt = Pt-1Zt-1, the ADL supply 
equation can be rewritten as: 
Q =[(αp0+αp1)/(1-αQ1)]P+[(αz0+αz1)/(1-αQ1)]Z 
   +[(αpz0+αpz1) /(1- αQ1)] PZ.                                         (11) 
        The long-run stationary solution is characterized by three long-run parameters, 
represented by the three brackets in (11).  To see this, add and delete Qt-1, αp0Pt-1, 
αz0Zt-1, and αpz0Pt-1Zt-1 on the right hand side of (10). The resulting supply function       
Qt=αp0Pt+αp1Pt-1+αz0Zt+αz1Zt-1+αpz0PtZt+αpz1Pt-1Zt-1            
+αQ1Qt-1+(Qt-1+αp0Pt-1+αz0Zt-1+αpz0Pt-1Zt-1) -Qt-1-αp0Pt-1-αz0Zt-1 
           - αpz0Pt-1Zt-1 + ηt ,  
can be rearranged as:       
  Qt-Qt-1 = (αp0Pt-αp0Pt-1) + (αp0Pt-1+αp1Pt-1)+ 
            +(αz0Zt-αz0Zt-1) +(αz0Zt-1+αz1Zt-1)+    16
            +(αpz0PtZt-αpz0Pt-1Zt-1) + ( αpz0Pt-1Zt-1+αpz1Pt-1Zt-1)+                                   
                  +(αQ1Qt-1-Qt-1)+ ηt. 
   or, using the difference operator: 
  ∆Qt=αp0∆Pt+(αp0+αP1)Pt-1+αz0∆Zt+(αz0+αz1)Zt-1+αPZ0∆PtZt  
+(αPZO+αPZ1)Pt-1Zt-1 +(αQ1-1)Qt-1+ ηt, 
where ∆ is the difference operator. 
  The error correction representation of the above equation is: 
 ∆Qt= αP0 ∆Pt + αz0 ∆Zt + αPZ0 ∆PtZt+ 
   +(1-αQ1){Qt-1-[(αP0+αP1)/(1-αQ1)]Pt-1-[(αz0+αz1)/(1-αQ1)]Zt-1+ 
+[(αPZO+αPZ1)/(1-αQ1)] Pt-1Zt-1 } + ηt.                                  (12) 
Adding an intercept term, and letting γ=1-αQ1, α*j=αj0+αj1 for j=P, Z, PZ, and 
k>1, equation (12) is written as: 





















∆(Pt-iZt-i )+γ (Qt-k- θpPt-k-θz Zt-k-θpz PtZt-k )+ηt ,       
  where      17
          θP =α*P/γ, θZ= α*Z/γ, θpz = α*PZ/γ. 
The summations capture the short-run dynamics parameters. The terms in brackets are 
the error correction model terms, which capture the stationary long-run relationship.   
Thus, the parameter θP measures the stationary (if there is cointegration) long-run impact 
of P on Q.  The parameter γ captures the impact of ∆Qt being away from the long-run 
target.  This approach accounts for autocorrelation and non-stationarity.  Assuming that 
the variables are stationary in their first differences, all the summations are stationary 
and, if the variables are co-integrated, the linear combination in the parenthesis is 
stationary. 
 
3.3.b The Margin Relation: 
  To identify oligopsony conduct in the short-run (λ0) and in the long-run (Λ), 
we reformulate equation (9) using the error correcting model framework.  Proceeding 
first with an ADL form with one lag and without an intercept term equation (9) becomes:    
      M = βQ0 Qt+βQ1 Qt-1+βw0 W+βW1 Wt-1+ λ0Q*t+λ1Q*t-1+ βM1Mt-1+νt    (13) 
where Q* is calculated using the long-run parameters from (12), i.e.,      
  Q*=Qt/ (θP+θPZZ), 
    or    18
  Q*=Qt / {[(αP0+αP1) / (1-αQ1)]+ [(αPZO+αPZ1)/(1-αQ1)] Z}. 
The short-run parameters are the coefficients on the contemporaneous variables, i.e. 
βQ0, βW0 and λ0.  The long-run stationary solution is found when M=Mt =Mt-1, 
Q=Qt =Qt-1, W=Wt=Wt-1 and Q=Q*t=Q*t-1.   
The ADL relationship equation in (13) then becomes: 
    M = [(βQ0+βQ1)/(1-βM1)] Q+[(βW0+βW1)/(1-βM1)] W+      
    +[(λQ*0+λQ*1)/(1-βM1)]Q*+νt                                      (14) 
        The long-run solution is characterized by three long-run parameters, represented by the 
three brackets in (14).  This is obtained by adding and deleting M t-1,  βQ0Qt-1, 
βW0Wt-1, and λQ*0Q*t-1 on the right hand side of (14) and then rearranging a manner 
similar to the supply function.   
 
This yields:       
∆Mt=βQ0 ∆Qt +βW0 ∆Wt +λ0∆Q*t+    19
 +(1-βM1){Mt-1-[(βQ0+βQ1)/(1-βM1)]Qt-1-[(βw0+βw1)/(1-βM1)]Wt-1         
+[(λ0+λ1)/(1-βM1)]Q*t-1} +νt .                                  (15) 
 
The short run parameters are the same as in the ADL model, but are now the 
coefficients on the contemporaneous differenced variables βQ0, βw0 and λ0. The long-
run parameters are the terms in the brackets. 
By adding an intercept term, denoting φ=1-βM1, β*j=βj0+βj1 for j=Q, W, and 
letting k >1, equation (15) can be written as: 





















λi∆Q*t-i +φ (Mt-k-ψQ Qt-k-ψw Wt-k - ΛQ*t-k )+ν t     (16) 
where 
  ψQ = β*Q/φ ,ψw=β*w/φ , Λ=λ*/φ. 
The error correction model formulation provides both a short-run estimate (λ0), and a 
long-run estimate (Λ) for λ.   
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4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
































∆(Pt-iVt-i )          (19) 
+γ (Qt-k-θpPt-k-θkKt-k-θvVt-k-θpkPtKt-k-θpvPtVt-k) 
+D2+D3+D4+ηt ,      
 






















λi∆Q*t-i+φ(Mt-k-ψQQt-k-ψwWt-k–ΛQ*t-k)     (20)                                             
+D2+D3+D4+νt. 
 
The dummy variables are added to capture seasonality in live cattle slaughter.  The 
raw data consist of quarterly observations on Q (commercial beef production), P (price of 
live cattle), K (price of corn), V (price of feeder cattle), M (the farm – wholesale spread), 
which is the difference between Pw (the wholesale price of beef) and the price of live cattle 
(P), and W (hourly wage of production workers in meatpacking plants).   
The sample starts the first quarter of 1970 and ends the second quarter of 2000.  All 
prices were deflated by the CPI, and the error terms are assumed to have the standard 
properties.   
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4.1 The Live Cattle Supply Function       
4.1.1 Integration 
We test for integration order using Dickey-Fuller’s augmented unit root test.  Table A 
in the Appendix contains integration tests for levels and first differences.  In levels, for 
the variable Q, for example, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity without a constant and 
no trend cannot be rejected at the 10% level.  The test statistic of –1.8455 is less (in 
absolute value) than the critical ADF value of –2.57.  The test statistic of 2.037, which is 
less than the critical value of 3.78, indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient of the constant term and the coefficient of the lagged value of Q are 
statistically different from zero.  Again, the hypothesis of non-stationarity with no trend 
cannot be rejected.  When considering the trend, non-stationarity cannot be rejected with 
and without a constant.  Similar test results for non-stationarity were obtained for the rest 
of the variables: P, K, V, PK, and PV.  
In the case of the first difference for the variable Q, the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity without a constant and no trend is rejected at the 10% level.  The test statistic 
of –3.126 (in absolute value) exceeds the critical ADF value of –2.57, indicating that 
non-stationarity can be rejected.  The test statistic of 4.8936, which also exceeds the 
critical value of 3.78 indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of 
the constant term and of the lag of the first difference of Q are statistically different from 
zero.  Again, the hypothesis of non-stationarity with no trend can be rejected.  When 
considering the trend, non-stationarity is rejected with and without a constant.  Similar 
test results for non-stationarity were obtained for the rest of the first differences in the 
rest of the variables.    22
Since the variables are stationary in the first differences, they will be used such as to 
specify the model.  Since the first differences of the variables in the live cattle supply 
function are stationary, the left-hand side variable in equation (19) as well as the 
explanatory variables expressed in the first differences are stationary, this allows us to 
use OLS in our estimation in order to obtain meaningful parameters.  The next step is to 
check if the variables in the parentheses are co-integrated.  If they are then we are certain 
about the existence of a long-term equilibrium relationship among these variables exists.     
 
4.1.2 Co-integration 
We test for co-integration by testing if the regression residuals have a unit root. The 
results in table B in the Appendix reveal the existence of a co-integrating relationship 
among Q, P, K, V, PK, and PV at 10% level of significance.  As we can see from table B 
the null hypothesis of no co-integration without a trend is rejected at the 10% level.  The 
test statistic of –48.123 exceeds (in absolute value) than the critical ADF value of –38.4.  
The test statistic of     –5.3435, when considering more than one lags, is more (in absolute 
value) than the critical value of –4.42, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis of 
no co-integration. When considering a trend, no co-integration is also rejected. 
 
4.1.3 Empirical Results  
Results for the supply function are presented in table 1. The Akaike’s Final 
Prediction Error was used to determine the lag-length k=1, in order to account for 
autocorrelation. The implied long-run parameters for constructing Q* are:    23
  θP= (-2239.9) / (-0.35352) = 6353.9 
  θpk = (1113930) / (-0.35252) = -323187.3  
θpv = (-594.74) / (-0.35252) = 1687.11. 
Table 1 
OLS Parameter Estimates of the Live Cattle Supply Function (19) 
 
      
PARAMETER ESTIMATED  COEF.  STAND. ERROR  T-RATIO  P-VALUE 
αP,0  -3609.7 999.99  -3.6098  0.0005 
αk,0  52734 36100  1.4608  0.147 
αV,0  219.85 1999.2  0.10997  0.9126 
αPK,0  -81329 59691  -1.3625  0.1759 
αPV,0  4290.9 3152.5  1.3611  0.1764 
γ                             -0.35252   0.672E-02  -5.2421  0 
γ θp  -2239.9 623.35  -3.5934  0.0005 
γ θk  -27802 21082  -1.3187  0.1901 
γ θv  153.7 294.56  0.52178  0.6029 
γ θpk  1.14E+05 36492  3.1221  0.0023 
γ θpv  -594.74 820.68  -0.7247  0.4702 
D2 231.08  39.378  5.8684  0 
D3 277.33  41.497  6.6832  0 
D4 55.567  41.492  1.3392  0.1834 
CONSTANT 2737.3  535.37  5.1128  0 
  
Checking for possible structural change, the CUSUMSQ (figure 3) statistic is 
consistently within its 5% bounds, while the recursive coefficients of the regressors    24
display no sudden variation as more data is added, indicating that the estimating equation 
is highly stable and shows no signs of underlying misspecification. 
The model was also estimated using 2SLS.  The 2SLS estimates were close to those 
obtained using OLS, the latter are used as basis for the rest of the discussion.    
  
Figure 3 
Cumulative Sum of Squared Recursive Residuals of the Cattle Supply Function 
 
 
4.2 The Margin Relation  
4.2.1 Integration 
We test for integration order using Dickey-Fuller’s augmented unit root test.  Table C in 
the Appendix contains integration tests for levels and first differences.  In levels, for the    25
variable M, for example, the null hypothesis of non- stationarity without a constant and 
no trend cannot be rejected at the 10% level.  The test statistic of –1.3296 is less than the 
critical ADF value of -2.57.  The test statistic of 1.1547, which is less than the critical 
value of 3.78 indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
constant term and of the lagged value of M are statistically different from zero. 
Again, the hypothesis of non-stationarity with no trend cannot be rejected.  When 
considering the trend, non-stationarity cannot be rejected with and without a constant.  
Similar test results for non-stationarity were obtained for the meatpacking wage (W).  
In the case of the first difference of the variable M, the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity without a constant and no trend is rejected at the 10% level.  The test statistic 
of –4.7488 is more (in absolute value) than the critical ADF value of –2.57, indicating 
that non-stationarity can be rejected.  The test statistic of 11.283, which exceeds the 
critical value of 3.78 indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of 
the constant term and of the lag of the first difference of Q are statistically different from 
zero.  Again, the hypothesis of non-stationarity with no trend can be rejected.  When 
considering the trend, non-stationarity is rejected with and without a constant.  Similar 
test results for non-stationarity were obtained for the variable W. 
 
4.2.2 Co-integration 
We test for co-integration by testing if the regression residuals have a unit root. 
Results in table D in the Appendix reveal the existence of a co-integrating relationship 
among M, Q and W at 10% level of significance.  The null hypothesis of no co-
integration without a trend is rejected at the 10% level.  The test statistic of -42.438    26
exceeds (in absolute value) the critical ADF value of -28.1.  The test statistic of -4.763, 
when considering more than one lag, exceeds (in absolute value) the critical value of -
3.81, indicating that the null hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected.  When 
considering a trend, no co-integration is rejected. 
4.2.3 Empirical Results  
Results for the margin relation are presented in table 2.  Akaike’s Final Prediction 
Error was used to decide for the lag-length k=1, in order to account for autocorrelation.  
Results from 2SLS are also available upon request. Again the CUSUMSQ (figure 4) 
statistic is consistently within its 5% bounds, and the recursive coefficients of the 
regressors display no sudden variation as more data is added, indicating that the 
estimating equation is highly stable and shows no signs of underlying misspecification.  
    Table 2 
OLS Parameter Estimates of the Margin Relation (20) 
PARAMETER  ESTIMATED.COEF.  STAND. ERROR  T- RATIO   P-VALUE 
βW,0  4.5146 1.9244  2.346  0.0208 
βQ,0  3.2209E-07 0.33195  0.097  0.9229 
λ  0.0012064 0.92268  1.3075  0.1938 
Φ  -0.32496 0.71287  -4.558  0 
Φψw  1.1325 0.30615  3.6991  0.0003 
ΦψQ  -2.2765E-06 0.21044  -1.0818  0.2817 
ΦΛ  0.0017187 0.90845  1.8919  0.0611 
D2 0.0040488  0.19575  2.0683  0.041 
D3 0.001808  0.20971  0.86216  0.3905 
D4 0.0012536  0.1876  0.66824  0.5054 
CONSTANT 0.0022974  0.14279  0.1609  0.8725 
    27
                Figure 4 




SUMMARY AND CONCULSIONS 
  Preponderance of econometric evidence suggests that the highly concentrated 
beef-packing industry exerts some degree of oligopsony power, although that degree is 
not large enough to warrant concern. Most the evidence is forthcoming from research 
along the lines of what called the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO), where 
market power is treated as a parameter to be inferred from single industry time-series data,    28
rather than something to be measured from accounting data in earlier cross-industry 
studies. 
When using time series, however, presence of non-stationary and co-integration of 
variables renders conventional significance tests unreliable, and may lead to erroneous 
inference about market conduct.  Since none of the past studies of competition in beef-
packing has checked for the properties of the time series before drawing conclusions 
about conduct in the industry, the question remains open as to whether past findings of 
benign market power in the cattle market are reliable.   
The purpose of this thesis is to revisit the estimation of oligopsony conduct in the 
US beef-packing sector in spot markets using an error correction model.  Oligopsony 
conduct in the industry is estimated by adapting to the oligopsony case the dynamic 
oligopoly model of Steen and Salvanes.  The contribution of our approach is that by using 
an error correction framework we account for short-run departures from long-run 
equilibrium in the data. In cattle markets, these short run deviations might be caused by 
factors such as random shocks, contracts, seasonal shifts etc., and by including lagged 
observations of the endogenous variables, we take into account dynamic factors, which 
cannot be included in static models. Thus, the error correction model provides a solution 
both to statistical problems generated by short-run dynamics and stationarity in the data 
as well as important dynamic factors that make static models inadequate. 
Using quarterly data for the 1970-2000 period, the hypothesis of competitive 
conduct in the short-run and in the long-run cannot be rejected.  The short-run estimate of 
oligopsony conduct is 0.0012 and the long-run estimate 0.0052.  Both are not statistically 
different from zero at the 5% level of significance.  The results represent another piece of    29
econometric evidence pointing to competitive conduct in the beef packing industry 
despite increased levels of buyer concentration. 
There are two major caveats to the study.  First, the behavioral model in this 
thesis does not consider captive supplies as a decision variable separate from cattle 
bought on the open market.  The second caveat is that the packer decision problem 
considered in this thesis is static.  This ignores the elements of strategic behavior that 
arise from the repeated interaction between packers in the live cattle market.  How that 
affects the estimate of the degree of oligopsony power in the industry is a question I 
intend to address in future research.         
 
            APPENDIX: 
          Table A 
Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Levels and First Differences in the 
Cattle Supply Function 
1.  Tests for Levels 
 
VARIABLE: Q 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =  10   NO.OBS =  111 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -1.8455     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           2.0237      3.78 
                                               AIC =    10.368 
                                                SC =    10.661 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -2.6347     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      2.5823      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           3.5443      5.34 
                                               AIC =    10.350 
                                                SC =    10.668 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------    30
 
  VARIABLE : P 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   4   NO.OBS =  117 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -1.0121     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0          0.88339      3.78 
                                               AIC =    -6.310 
                                                SC =    -6.168 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.9928     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      5.6524      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           8.0607      5.34 
                                               AIC =    -6.420 
                                                SC =    -6.255 
 
 
 VARIABLE : K 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   3   NO.OBS =  118 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -1.1165     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0          0.88600      3.78 
                                               AIC =   -13.533 
                                                SC =   -13.416 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -2.7686     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      2.7996      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           3.9237      5.34 
                                               AIC =   -13.573 
                                                SC =   -13.432 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  VARIABLE : V 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =  10   NO.OBS =  111 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -2.0047     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           2.3333      3.78 
                                               AIC =    -8.016 
                                                SC =    -7.723 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.3841     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      4.0984      4.03    31
  A(1)=A(2)=0           5.8030      5.34 
                                               AIC =    -8.070 
                                                SC =    -7.753 
 
 
 VARIABLE : PK 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   6   NO.OBS =  115 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST      -0.88030     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0          0.68537      3.78 
                                               AIC =   -13.908 
                                                SC =   -13.717 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -2.9686     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      3.2149      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           4.5045      5.34 
                                               AIC =   -13.965 
                                                SC =   -13.750 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  VARIABLE : PV 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   5   NO.OBS =  116 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -1.9228     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           1.9858      3.78 
                                               AIC =    -7.650 
                                                SC =    -7.484 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.8851     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      5.1315      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           7.5472      5.34 
                                               AIC =    -7.730 
                                                SC =    -7.540 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2. First Differences 
  VARIABLE : (1-B) Q 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =  10   NO.OBS =  110 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------    32
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.1260     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           4.8936      3.78 
                                               AIC =    10.383 
                                                SC =    10.678 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.1616     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      3.3793      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           5.0613      5.34 
                                               AIC =    10.397 
                                                SC =    10.716 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  VARIABLE : (1-B) P 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   4   NO.OBS =  116 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   
CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -5.0484     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           12.744      3.78 
                                               AIC =    -6.297 
                                                SC =    -6.154 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -5.0318     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      8.4564      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           12.684      5.34 
                                               AIC =    -6.280 
                                                SC =    -6.114 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 VARIABLE : (1-B) K 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =  10   NO.OBS =  110 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.4897     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           6.0901      3.78 
                                               AIC =   -13.411 
                                                SC =   -13.117 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.5234     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      4.1396      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           6.2081      5.34 
                                               AIC =   -13.396 
                                                SC =   -13.077 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  VARIABLE : (1-B) V 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   6   NO.OBS =  114 
    33
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -4.3088     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           9.2831      3.78 
                                               AIC =    -8.009 
                                                SC =    -7.817 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -4.2816     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      6.1407      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           9.2111      5.34 
                                               AIC =    -7.991 
                                                SC =    -7.775 
 
 
 VARIABLE : (1-B) PK 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   7   NO.OBS =  113 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.8311     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           7.3396      3.78 
                                               AIC =   -13.886 
                                                SC =   -13.668 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.8335     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      4.8992      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           7.3481      5.34 
                                               AIC =   -13.869 
                                                SC =   -13.628 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  VARIABLE : (1-B) PV 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   8   NO.OBS =  112 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.7674     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           7.0977      3.78 
                                               AIC =    -7.578 
                                                SC =    -7.335 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -3.7404     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      4.6934      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           7.0391      5.34 
                                               AIC =    -7.560 
                                                SC =    -7.293    34
                                         Table B 
Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on Co-integration in the 
Cattle Supply Function 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
COINTEGRATING REGRESSION - CONSTANT, NO TREND   NO.OBS =  122 
 REGRESSAND : Q 
  R-SQUARE = 0.6493         DURBIN-WATSON = 0.7947 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS ON RESIDUALS - NO.LAGS =  0   M =  6 
                         TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
                       STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  NO CONSTANT, NO TREND 
          Z-TEST       -48.123     -38.4 
          T-TEST       -5.3435     -4.42 
                                               AIC =    10.550 
                                                SC =    10.573 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 COINTEGRATING REGRESSION - CONSTANT, TREND      NO.OBS =  122 
 REGRESSAND : Q 
  R-SQUARE = 0.6617         DURBIN-WATSON = 0.8135 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS ON RESIDUALS - NO.LAGS =  0   M =  6 
                         TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
                       STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
  NO CONSTANT, NO TREND 
          Z-TEST       -49.899     -43.5 
          T-TEST       -5.4866     -4.70 
                                               AIC =    10.527 
                                                SC =    10.551    35
 
     T a b l e   C  
Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Levels and First Differences in the 
Margin Relation 
1. Test for Levels 
 
VARIABLE : M 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   2   NO.OBS =  119 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -1.3296     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           1.1547      3.78 
                                               AIC =    -9.815 
                                                SC =    -9.721 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -1.4845     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      1.1516      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           1.4562      5.34 
                                               AIC =    -9.808 
                                                SC =    -9.691 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
 VARIABLE : W 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   4   NO.OBS =  117 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -1.0219     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           1.7452      3.78 
                                               AIC =   -16.090 
                                                SC =   -15.948 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   
CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -1.9171     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      2.1128      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           1.9264      5.34 
                                               AIC =   -16.098 
                                                SC =   -15.933 
 
 
    36
2. First Differences 
 
VARIABLE : (1-B) M 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   5   NO.OBS =  115 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -4.7488     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           11.283      3.78 
                                               AIC =    -9.796 
                                                SC =    -9.629 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -4.8747     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      8.0485      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           12.066      5.34 
                                               AIC =    -9.792 
                                                SC =    -9.601 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  VARIABLE : (1-B) W 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS - NO.LAGS =   4   NO.OBS =  116 
 
      NULL               TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
   HYPOTHESIS          STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, NO TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -2.5653     -2.57 
  A(0)=A(1)=0           3.3266      3.78 
                                               AIC =   -16.075 
                                                SC =   -15.933 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CONSTANT, TREND 
  A(1)=0  T-TEST       -2.5464     -3.13 
  A(0)=A(1)=A(2)=0      2.2437      4.03 
  A(1)=A(2)=0           3.3297      5.34 
                                               AIC =   -16.059 
                                                SC =   -15.893 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
          T a b l e   D  
Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller’s Test on Co-integration in the Margin Relation 
______________________________________________________________________ 
COINTEGRATING REGRESSION - CONSTANT, NO TREND   NO.OBS =  121 
 REGRESSAND : M 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS ON RESIDUALS - NO.LAGS =  0   M =  4 
                         TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
                       STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------    37
  NO CONSTANT, NO TREND 
          Z-TEST       -42.438     -28.1 
          T-TEST       -4.7631     -3.81 
                                               AIC =    -9.822 
                                                SC =    -9.799 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 COINTEGRATING REGRESSION - CONSTANT, TREND      NO.OBS =  121 
 REGRESSAND : M 
  DICKEY-FULLER TESTS ON RESIDUALS - NO.LAGS =  0   M =  4 
 
                         TEST      ASY. CRITICAL 
                       STATISTIC     VALUE 10% 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  NO CONSTANT, NO TREND 
          Z-TEST       -41.364     -33.5 
          T-TEST       -4.6437     -4.15 
                                               AIC =    -9.850 




   VARIALE  DEFINITION   
Data were collected from the web pages listed in the bibliography.  
Q = Commercial beef production (millions lbs) 
P = Price of cattle (cents / retail lbs) 
K = Price of corn ($ / bushel) 
V = Price of feeder cattle ($/ 100 lbs) 
M = Farm – wholesale beef margin (cents / retail lbs) 
W = Meatpacking wage ($ / hour) 
PK = Interaction term between P an K 
PV = Interaction term between P an V 
CPI = Consumer price index (base year = 1967) 
 
 
    38
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